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I. BACKGROUND
A global movement that seeks to address the failure of the 
human rights system to hold corporations accountable 
for violations is gathering momentum.1  Indeed, the issue 
of violations of human rights by corporations has been 
described by one prominent human rights judge as “the 
human rights issue of the 21st century”2.  Corporate 
accountability has accordingly become a pivotal issue of 
human rights policy reform, legal inquiry, academic interest, 
as well as a critical issue in the work of key NGOs. An 
important theme in the literature is that international law has 
failed to rise to the challenge of imposing universal legal 
standards capable of adequately protecting against human 
rights abuses3.  
In the most recent major corporate human rights policy 
initiative, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative 
business and human rights, Prof. John Ruggie (2005-2011) 
eschewed the use of binding legal standards and rejected 
the prospect for establishing a set of norms in international 
law.  Instead Ruggie advocated the incorporation of a ‘soft 
law’ instrument that seeks consensus across governments, 
international organisations and corporations. On 16th June 
2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
that established a Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and business and broadly supported John Ruggie’s 
framework for business and transnational corporations.  The 
Working Group was charged with looking at how best to 
implement the UN framework. 
Despite arguments from some states that an international 
binding treaty would be unable to adequately address the 
complexity of corporate responsibility, some international 
NGOs and some developing countries have continued to 
stress the importance of binding norms for corporations.   
The recent adoption of Resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 for 
the “Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument 
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with respect to human rights” is evidence of a new space in 
the struggle to make corporations accountable for violations 
of human rights. The initial proposal, led by Ecuador and 
South Africa, was supported by over 80 States, including 
the African Group, the Arab Group, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru.  
The Resolution was adopted by majority at the Human Rights 
Council’s 26th Session on 26th June 2014 despite fierce 
opposition, namely from the USA and the EU. Thus, despite 
Professor Ruggie’s urge for caution against drafting a treaty 
or a solution in international ‘hard’ law, the UN Human Rights 
Council is beginning to seek ways to establish more binding 
legal standards.
Ongoing state-corporate collusion in human rights abuses is 
a continued concern for the UN Human Rights Council.  A 
particular concern is the long term threat to the legitimacy 
of a system of human rights observance that relies upon 
state systems that are inconsistent and often ill-equipped 
to deal with these issues, or indeed depend upon the 
active intervention of governments who very often have 
a vested interest.  Notable examples of this complicity 
include accusations of the use slave labour in Burma which 
implicated Unocal;4 cultural genocide, ethnic discrimination, 
and violations to the right to a healthy environment in 
Ecuador that have been blamed on Texaco amongst other 
oil companies;5 cultural genocide and the criminalisation of 
social protest in Guatemala regarding indigenous struggles 
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of the Sipakapa People against the GoldCorp Mining 
Company;6 the criticism of the role of Royal Dutch Shell in 
widespread intimidation and murder/death of Ogoni activists 
in Nigeria;7 murder, extra-judicial killings, kidnapping, unlawful 
detention, disappearances and torture of employees and 
activists at Coca-Cola facilities in Colombia;8 and culpable 
environmental disaster and wilful lack of observance for 
safety norms in the workplace not least the ongoing human 
rights catastrophe in Bhopal, India has implicated Union 
Carbide and Dow Chemicals.9
II. IDENTIFYING THE ISSUE
Corporations may be directly or indirectly implicated in 
human rights violations. Direct corporate involvement in 
human rights violations include activities undertaken by 
employees of the corporation such as torture, unlawful 
detention, and intimidation of those opposing corporate 
agendas. Less direct involvement in human rights violations 
includes corporate collusion in state human rights violations, 
the sub-contracting of services that violate human rights, 
engaging in activities that create a context that encourage 
state violations, dealing with states engaged in systematic 
violations of human rights, and the manufacturing and sale of 
products, particularly weapons and military equipment, that 
facilitate human rights violations.10 
Perhaps most controversially, corporations are now involved 
in combat, detention and security activities that commonly 
involve accusations of human rights violations.  Despite 
growing concern about corporations and human rights there 
is currently a lacuna in effective corporate accountability 
mechanisms to deal with these violations.11 The enhanced 
power that many private corporations have accumulated 
including their enhanced role in delivering state security 
functions  has not been matched by checks and balances 
capable of scrutinizing and holding corporations accountable. 
Corporations are not subject to the same human rights 
accountability mechanism as states and extant corporate 
accountability mechanisms are widely acknowledged as 
weak or ineffective.12
III. THE RESEARCH 
It is within this context of increasing interest and attention 
from the international community to address corporate 
violations of human rights that this research emerged. The 
research that led to this briefing is part of a long-term project 
conducted by the authors of this briefing and funded by the 
British Academy, that explores the perspectives of judges and 
officials at the Inter-American (IACtHR) and European Courts 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the feasibility of developing 
mechanisms capable of holding corporations accountable for 
violations of human rights. 
Interviews with 14 judges at the IACtHR and the ECtHR in 
the course of this research revealed that all of the judges 
interviewed supported the contention that a range of non-
state entities in general, and corporations in particular, should 
be held accountable for human rights violations, although not 
necessarily held responsible. In light of this, a large majority 
of respondents were against the idea of using the existing 
human rights courts to impute responsibility directly upon 
corporations; rather, the majority supported the creation of 
a new, specialised body to address the issue of corporate 
harms.  A significant minority of judges were supportive 
of the idea of developing existing mechanisms within their 
respective courts in order to encompass corporate violations 
of human rights within the gambit of the court’s supervisory 
mechanism (albeit through the development of new principles 
triggering state responsibility).
For the purpose of exploring this research finding further, the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council funded this follow-
up study to examine in more detail the form that such a 
mechanism might take and how it might function. This short 
study uses data gathered from three focus groups held at 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg on 27th March 2014.  The focus 
groups included a range of different people involved in the 
work of the Court: judges, members from the Registrar’s 
office, ad hoc judges and lawyers from the Court. The 
focus groups were held following a brief seminar on the 
topic which included presentations from ECtHR President 
Justice Dean Spielmann and Section President Justice Ineta 
Ziemele. Participants were divided into three groups of 6-8 
people. They were then asked to focus their discussions 
around three principle areas: firstly, the positive aspects 
of a new mechanism; secondly, the barriers to creating a 
new mechanism; and thirdly, ideas about what the new 
mechanism might look like or would require to come to 
fruition.  Data was gathered and analysed using the Ketso 
methodology, developed at the University of Manchester.13
IV. OPTIONS FOR A NEW MECHANISM FOR 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
1. What are the advantages of a new mechanism 
for corporate accountability? 
Participants identified a number of advantages of establishing 
a new mechanism for corporate accountability. The major 
advantage of a new mechanism was the potential of 
establishing a “tailor-made approach” to address corporate 
violations of human rights. The suggestions centred around 
two principle axes. The first explored the re-orientation of 
human rights law in order to allow direct responsibility14 for 
human rights violations to be imputed to corporations; the 
second explored ways of modifying the existing human rights 
system. There was awareness across the three groups that 
the European human rights system already addresses the 
most important human rights violations. In this respect there 
was a general acknowledgement that the ECtHR has dealt 
with cases against states that involve violations of human 
rights by corporations acting in Europe. Rather than “recreate 
the wheel” (F3/1)15, as one participant put it, the discussion 
should rather be centred on how to use existing human rights 
courts. Suggestions for how the European Court might be 
modified included:
a) Creating a new specialised sub-Chamber or forum 
specifically tailored to deal with corporate accountability 
(outlined in more detail below at Section IV).
b) Extending jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights in order to address state responsibility 
for violations of human rights by corporations domiciled in 
European states that operate outside Europe.
c) Expanding upon existing mechanisms by reinforcing the 
interpretative power of judges to address corporate harms and 
underline the responsibility of the state. Suggestions included 
allowing for more generous interpretations of the doctrine of 
positive obligations16, including the horizontal effect17, due 
diligence18, and duty to remedy19.  
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The majority of participants were against the idea of creating 
a totally new forum, seeing this option as one participant 
suggested as “politically unrealistic” (F1/4). This same 
participant went on to remark that there “… will always be 
a strong economic argument that [corporations and states] 
will make as an objection to any form of accountability … 
there are many states that for economic reasons would be 
very reluctant to impose a regime of accountability on their 
national corporations”.  It is this appraisal of the current 
situation that prompted the majority of respondents to focus 
their discussions on the possibilities for developing a new 
mechanism within the existing regional human rights courts.  
As one participant noted “[we] should try to imagine some 
kind of low key proposal, a softer proposal that will stand a 
chance of being accepted” (F1/4). 
A common feature of the focus group discussions was an 
emphasis on the need for a mechanism that would have 
“a realistic impact” (F1/1) or that could be most realistically 
achieved (F2/1; F1/4). Nonetheless, there was a sizable 
minority who maintained some optimism in developing a new 
forum. 
2. The Barriers to creating a New Mechanism
Participants were asked to reflect on the barriers to creating 
a new international mechanism to address corporate harms. 
Responses have been grouped into the following five themes.
The first barrier identified by all groups was the economic 
and political power of corporations. Participants anticipated 
that the introduction of a new mechanism would be 
hindered due to the lobbying power of corporations and 
their political influence. This hindrance was clearly identified 
by a participant who commented that the main barriers 
are the “(…) lack of political will in the first place and the 
enormous power of TNCs in the second” (F2/1). The same 
participant went on to assert that an impartial investigation 
into corporate violations of human rights was “not feasible 
at all” (F2/1). This was supported by a colleague who 
suggested that “they [the investigators] would never be 
impartial” (F2/3). Over all, focus group participants had very 
little hope in the possibility of establishing a new  forum that 
would not be influenced by corporate interests or as another 
participant pointed out “the weakness [of a new forum] is that 
corporations are very powerful in pleading their cause” (F1/4). 
Second, a related concern was that that the imposition of 
legal restrictions on corporations could have the effect of 
imposing an effective social wage on weaker economies 
(F2).  For some, this “Eurocentric approach” (F1/4) could be 
detrimental to the economy of the host country. In the words 
of one participant, “[the companies] will close their operations 
and… because they won’t have any taxes to collect from that 
company or so they won’t only be tortured but unemployed 
and tortured!”. There was therefore widespread concern 
about the economic damage that might transpire by 
imposing binding legal norms on corporations. The concern 
was that by imposing a form of accountability, corporations 
would simply exercise their right to “forum-shop” (F1/2) for a 
new State with more lenient regulations.  
Third, a minority of participants identified the structure of the 
modern corporation as “the biggest obstacle to any traditional 
mechanism” of corporate accountability. One participant noted 
that the scale of the modern corporations was a key problem 
because of “the difficulty of determining which [company is 
responsible].”  A related point made by other respondents 
was that because of the size of a lot of corporations, it’s often 
difficult to determine who may be responsible for a particular 
act. One asked: “Is it the maison mère, the local branch, 
or….” (F1/4).  Another participant suggested that “it is actually 
the beneficial owners of the corporations that should be held 
liable because they set up the whole chain and it is their will do 
certain things” (F1/7). In other words, participants argued that 
it is in fact the shareholders who should be held liable since 
they are the real owners of the company.  
The seminar was hosted at the European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg, and attracted more than 50 participants
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Fourth, one focus group raised the related problem of how to 
distinguish the responsible party without a direct delegation 
of authority between the host state and the corporation.  One 
respondent asked: “[if there is not] this link between the state 
and the company, then what do we do? Who is responsible?” 
(F2/4). 
Finally, a majority of participants noted that there remains a 
lack of expertise in the ECtHR and other regional courts to 
deal with corporate violations of human rights. This opinion 
was shared by several participants in Group 2 who agreed 
that “we [the ECtHR] are not well equipped in terms of our 
expertise to deal with issues which would involve MNCs who 
are in breach of human rights” (F2/3). 
All of the focus groups pointed to the difficulties of accurately 
designating a responsible party; defining which State ought 
to be implicated; and which rung of the corporate ladder is 
responsible, i.e. the headquarters or the subsidiaries. The 
transnationality of some corporations was identified as a 
problem for any mechanism that might be used to seek 
redress for corporate harms.
Despite the problems outlined above, there was unanimity 
that the current gap in international standards applying to 
corporate human rights violations requires some kind of 
international mechanism, be it a new forum or a development 
within the already-existing human rights supervisory 
mechanisms.  As one participant proposed, “countries do 
not want to deal with these [corporate accountability] issues 
[alone], so they won’t regulate the companies unless (…) 
there is a national or international forum to allow that space 
for them. Then maybe we would see some changes” (F2/1).  
3. What form might this new mechanism take?
There were several recommendations on the appropriate 
form and location of a new mechanism to address corporate 
harms. 
First, a reorganisation of the ECtHR was suggested: rather 
than divide the cases by Section corresponding to the 
nationality of the judges (there are currently five Sections and 
the Grand Chamber), it was suggested that the cases be 
dealt with according to the specialisation and competencies 
of the judges. The logistics of this approach was explained 
by one participant as expanding upon what has been “(…) 
happening at the Registrar’s filtering system [where] they have 
instituted a specialist sub committee and they have been put 
together by skill and competencies; and there is absolutely 
no reason why that shouldn’t encompass the entire court. So 
we’re suggesting that there be a corporate chamber” (F3/1). 
It was suggested that this could be done on a case-by-case 
basis where the ECtHR might sit “in some special formation 
dealing with special issues and cases” (F3/5). 
Second, some proposals included locating the new 
mechanism at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague, discussed in Group 1.  The status of the ICJ as 
an international forum of longstanding political legitimacy, 
the plural legal system upon which it is based20, and its 
organisation into specialised chambers (see Article 2621 of the 
ICJ) makes this an institution that some saw as appropriate 
as a host of a ‘corporate human rights chamber’. 
Third, some argued that rather than one forum for corporate 
accountability at the international level, it would be more 
appropriate to have regional fora that might be better 
equipped to deal with violations in a particular part of the 
world, with some harmonization between the tribunals. 
Such fora could be set up as permanent tribunals.  It was 
suggested that judges sitting in these specialised branches 
could be ad hoc or seconded from the relevant regional 
human rights court.  Participants explained that this would 
provide easier access for victims as well as perhaps provide 
more legitimacy to the process given that victims may not be 
able to travel to a different region or continent to petition their 
rights. In response to this point, one participant suggested 
that “maybe we (the Court) should have an ECtHR branch in 
Bangladesh or Cambodia for instance. The UN has offices 
all over the place, so the Court could have offices as well” 
(F1/7).   
Fourth, all three groups raised the possibility of extending 
the Rome Statute in the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
apply to corporate, as well as natural, persons.  However, 
there was caution about for reopening the debate within 
the framework of the ICC.  Some pointed out the ICC 
has an “enormously high threshold” (F2/4) and applies a 
particular interpretation of the crimes and perpetrators of 
the crimes that it pursues. One participant stated that it 
was understandable that the ICC did not adjudicate against 
corporations because, corporate violations are “peanuts” 
(F2/1) compared to the grave breaches or crimes against 
humanity the court deals with. 
Finally, one group proposed that a regional human rights 
commissioner could oversee the implementation of national 
legislation and/or national initiatives to address corporate 
harms. According to one participant, “the most realistic 
possibility at the regional level is to set up some form of 
commissioner who has the responsibility for developing 
corporate responsibility at the national level and bringing it 
back to the regional system” (F1/4). From this starting point, 
perhaps a regional or international mechanism might be 
set up at the behest of one or two countries that are willing 
to push legal mechanisms of corporate accountability. The 
groups noted that standards might be agreed in a charter 
that might be tailored for the specificity of corporations in the 
same way that the Social Charter is tailored to account for 
civil and political rights as well as for economic and social 
rights. Group 1 explored what the role and portfolio of a 
regional corporate human rights commissioner might look 
like.  They concluded that it should be a person “…whose 
responsibility it is to develop corporate codes of conduct, 
to preach best practices to states regarding accountability 
and remedies and some sort of fact-finding capacity with 
respect to egregious violations of companies registered in 
European countries irrespective of where those violations 
take place” (F1/4). The question arose whether this person 
would have an investigatory or authoritative role. Would s/
he have “the competence to  hold a company accountable 
[or clearly identify a human rights violation] or have more of 
an arbitrational role” (F1/6)?  The feasibility of harmonizing 
national laws to address corporate harms was questioned; 
yet the response to this problem by a number of participants 
was that such an approach would also provide the 
opportunity for European states to be more assertive in their 
legislative functions. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has 
addressed the issue of business and human rights. In 
Resolution 1757 (2010), the Parliamentary Assembly critiqued 
the legal vacuum created by the reliance on “corporate social 
responsibility” measures which are, the Resolution points out, 
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“… essentially only ‘soft’ law instruments or voluntary codes 
of conduct. They lack effective judicial or other legally binding 
mechanisms to protect victims of abuses by businesses”. 
Resolution 1757, amongst other things, calls upon Member 
States to:
7.2. Encourage the implementation of the United 
Nations “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights”22 by business entities 
registered within their jurisdiction;
7.3. Legislate, if necessary, to protect individuals from 
corporate abuses of rights enshrined in the Convention 
and in the revised European Social Charter (ETS No. 
163).
The call by the UN Human Rights Council (noted above) 
to begin drafting a a legally binding agreement that 
addresses corporate harms appears to be consistent with 
the current policy of the Council of Europe.  A binding 
agreement may not offer a quick fix to solve the problem 
of corporate violations of human rights, but it could at least 
begin to tackle some of the related issues (regulatory gaps, 
uneven standards of domestic oversight, monitoring and 
enforcement) but also would begin to offer alternative means 
of remedy for victims.  Such a move would, of course require 
some form of judicial enforcement mechanism.  In this report 
we have considered some of the options to develop such 
a mechanism, as proposed by human rights professionals: 
judges, lawyers and court officials.  
In conclusion, those respondents identified a number of 
significant barriers to the development of such a mechanism.  
Amongst such perceived barriers, the most widely referred 
to was the power of the corporate lobby; other barriers 
cited in the focus group discussions were barriers that 
are also commonly promoted by corporations themselves 
(the economic impact of regulating corporate conduct, 
the complexities of law and of corporate structures).  Yet, 
respondents were also clear about the pressing need for 
reform, and were generally clear about the central role that 
courts and related legal form can play.  In summary, the 
judicial mechanisms proposed included:  
1. A reorganisation of the ECtHR to create a section 
that could bring together judges specialisation and 
competency in the cases involving non-state actors. 
2. A corporate human rights chamber based at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. 
3. Specialised permanent tribunals at a regional level 
(linked to existing human rights courts) with some level 
of harmonization across tribunals and judges from the 
human rights courts.
4. The extension of the Rome Statute in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to apply to corporate, as well as 
natural persons.
5. National mechanisms overseen by regional human 
rights commissioners (appointed by the UNHRC or the 
regional human rights courts)
Clearly some of those proposals will need to be fully worked 
through before they become serious ‘proposals’.  However, in 
this context, it is worth noting that some of those proposals 
have had some extended consideration.   Thus, for example, 
corporate persons did feature in earlier versions of the Rome 
Statute.  Moreover, the preamble to the ‘Draft Statute of 
the World Court of Human Rights’ proposed by Nowak and 
Kozma23 sets out a ‘21st Century’ approach to human rights 
which recognizes “States can no longer be considered as the 
only actors that can be held accountable for human rights 
violations”, and that a “World Court of Human Rights should 
become the focal point for non-criminal accountability of 
both States and non-State actors”.24 A similar proposal for a 
World Court of Human Rights tabled by Martin Scheinin also 
incorporates non-state actors.25
The conclusions reached in this report and therefore not 
necessarily novel; neither do they constitute an exhaustive 
exploration for alternative mechanisms.  Rather this report 
is offered as a contribution to a debate that is gaining some 
momentum.  Modest though this research project is, it is 
significant in the sense that it reflects the views and the 
practical experience of human rights professionals.   For this 
reason we regard it as a significant point of orientation for 
exploring the mechanisms that will be required to implement 
a new set of human rights standards for corporations. 
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